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LOCATING THE REGULATION OF DATA 
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY 
Edward J. Janger 
In our 2007 Article on notification of security breaches, Paul Schwartz 
and I explored the concept of a centralized response agent to help 
coordinate private and public efforts to respond to data spills.1 In that 
Article, we were agnostic about whether the coordinated response agent 
should be public or private, and if public where, institutionally, it should be 
situated.2 An important element of that agnosticism was our retrospective 
focus. We were concerned with response to breaches that had already 
occurred. The question of regulating data security and privacy is, of course, 
broader, encompassing the formulation of norms for appropriate data use, 
data protection, and breach response.3 In this essay, I will briefly address 
my agnosticism, and ask, more broadly, which institutions might best 
handle the generation and enforcement of legal entitlements regarding 
invasions of privacy and data security breaches. 
The occasion for asking this question is the recent enactment of the 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which creates, as a 
crucial component of efforts to reregulate the banking industry, a Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or the Bureau).4 The principal goal of 
the new Bureau will be to examine consumer credit instruments as products 
to ensure that they are “safe” for consumers to “use.”5 The proposal for such 
an agency, made initially by Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill, was 
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 1. Paul M. Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 913 (2007) [hereinafter Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches]. 
 2. See id. at 961. 
 3. We have addressed these questions as well in earlier work, both together and separately. 
See generally Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Information 
Privacy, and the Limits of Default Rules, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1219 (2002) [hereinafter Janger & 
Schwartz, Limits on Default Rules]; Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs and 
the Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899 (2003) [hereinafter Janger, Anticommons]; Edward J. 
Janger, Muddy Property: Generating and Protecting Information Privacy Norms in Bankruptcy, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1801 (2003) [hereinafter Janger, Muddy Property]. 
 4. At the time of the Symposium, the proposal for the “Bureau” was embodied in the 
Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong. § 111 (2009). In 
July, President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). Title X of that Act was called the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010. Id. Instead of creating a separate agency, that Act created a 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau within the Federal Reserve Bank. Id. 
 5. Id. 
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based on two linked insights.6 First, that modern consumer credit 
instruments—be they mortgages, credit cards, or debit cards—are just as 
much products as a toaster.7 And second, that while there is a consumer 
products safety commission that is tasked with ensuring the safety of 
toasters, there is no similar agency tasked with ensuring that financial 
products are safe.8 Warren and Bar-Gill note that there is a congeries of 
agencies that have some jurisdiction over consumer financial protection—
the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC), and so on.9 Most of these agencies have as their focus 
the regulation of the banking system, rather than the protection of a bank’s 
customers.10 The FTC alone focuses on consumer protection, but its 
jurisdiction is spread across the market generally.11 
The discussion of the CFPB might not, at first glance, seem relevant to 
questions of data privacy in the payment system. Indeed, much of the 
discussion of the safety of consumer financial products has focused on the 
credit and repayment terms associated with credit cards and mortgages.12 
But the use and security of data gathered and transferred in credit and 
payment card transactions is every bit as much a danger of these products as 
over-indebtedness.13 Identity theft and invasion of privacy are harms 
associated with these products. Moreover, the contracting process 
associated with such non-price terms is particularly prone to lemons 
equilibria, and hence even more problematic than that relating to the price 
of credit.14 Therefore, it is fair to ask whether data privacy and data security 
ought to be included in the mission of the CFPB. 
In this essay, I will explore whether locating regulation of data privacy 
and data security in the CFPB would be beneficial, or whether jurisdiction 
would be better left to the existing regulators. I argue that responsibility for 
protecting personal information would best be split in two. The generation 
of privacy and data security norms can—and probably should—be situated 
                                                                                                                                          
 6. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 98–100 
(2008). 
 7. See id. at 3–6. 
 8. See id. at 4–5. 
 9. See id. at 86. 
 10. See id. at 85. 
 11. See id. at 86. 
 12. Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, 
Behaviorism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1513 
(2006). 
 13. See infra Part I.C (discussion on Hannaford Brothers and TJX Companies). 
 14. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41 (2d ed. 1997); 
George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 
84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in 
Unconscionability and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 49 (1993); Janger & Schwartz, 
Limits on Default Rules, supra note 3, at 1240–41; Michael Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, 
Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 561 (1977). 
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in an agency like the CFPB. By contrast, measures for responding to data 
spills might best be coordinated by the existing banking-focused agencies. 
Finally, regulation of data security precautions should be shared between 
the consumer protection agency and the bank regulatory agency. 
This Article will proceed in three steps. First, I will explain the 
differences between data privacy and data security, and describe the 
existing regulatory architecture. In the second part, I will explore the 
various ways in which data privacy and data security norms can be 
fashioned, starting with contract, then self-regulation, and finally methods 
of public regulation. Third, I will discuss the possibility that, while the 
CFPB has a role to play in regulating data privacy and data security, there 
are important differences between norm generation for data privacy, data 
security, and loss mitigation that suggest different locations for regulatory 
authority. I will argue that the proposed CFPB has an important role to play 
in the formulation of the data privacy and data security norms that govern 
consumer relationships with their banks. By contrast, loss mitigation may 
be more appropriately handled through industry self-regulation, or through 
the regulatory institutions that are focused on systemic risk. 
I. DATA PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY 
Data privacy and data security are closely related concepts, but they are 
not the same. Data privacy requires that data be kept secure, but data may 
be kept secure for reasons other than privacy.15 Entities that wish to hold 
their data secure may not care at all about the privacy of those who 
disclosed the data.16 So first, it is important to define terms. If data privacy 
is viewed as the power to keep data secluded and safe from view, then data 
privacy and data security are the same. This conflation turns, however, on 
the mistaken view that data privacy is purely about concealment. This is 
only partially true. In all contexts that matter, data privacy involves a 
bilateral or multilateral relationship between a discloser and a recipient, or 
recipients, of information.17 Privacy is not usually about data concealment, 
it is about enforcing norms and expectations with regard to data sharing.18  
                                                                                                                                          
 15. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1663 
(2001) (describing the “data seclusion deception”). The conflation of privacy and security arises 
from the mistaken impression that data privacy is actually about keeping data private. Id. 
 16. For example, data aggregators such as Choice Point or credit reporting agencies gather 
personal information, and keep it secure, not because they care particularly about consumer 
expectations of privacy, but because information is their stock-in-trade. Schwartz & Janger, Data 
Security Breaches, supra note 1, at 922–23. 
 17. See Schwartz, supra note 15, at 1660 (“We can refer to these ideas as . . . the ‘autonomy 
trap’ and . . . the ‘data seclusion deception.’”); see also ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL 
DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 51–88 (1995). See generally Robert C. 
Post, The Social Foundations Of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. 
L. REV. 957 (1989). 
 18. See Janger, Anticommons, supra note 3, at 904–08. 
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In the payment system, for example, a purchaser reveals his or her 
identity and account information to a merchant, the merchant passes that 
information through a data conduit to the clearance network, the availability 
of funds or credit is verified, and the transaction is processed.19 Along the 
way, at least four entities are given access to potentially sensitive personal 
information. The merchant learns the customer’s name, credit card number, 
and purchasing preferences. Some or all of that information is also passed 
to the merchant’s bank, the clearance network (i.e., Visa, MasterCard, 
Amex), and to the customer’s bank.20 All of these disclosures may be fairly 
characterized as consistent with the primary purpose of the discloser—
accomplishing payment. 
Data privacy refers to the norms which govern information sharing and 
the permitted secondary uses of disclosed information by each of the 
entities that handle or come into possession of personal information.21 The 
touchstone is the discloser’s reasonable expectations of privacy.22 Privacy 
norms govern what happens once these various entities have identifiable 
personal information about the discloser. What may they do with that 
information? With whom may they share it? What secondary uses of 
personal information are permitted to the recipients of that information? 
Data security, by contrast, regulates the procedures for ensuring that the 
disclosed information remains where the parties to the transaction intend 
and may be accessed only by people who are authorized.23 Thus, a privacy 
violation usually involves an intentional act by the information recipient 
                                                                                                                                          
 19. LYNN M. LOPUCKI, ELIZABETH WARREN, DANIEL KEATING & RONALD J. MANN, 
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 317 (4th ed. 2009). 
 20. Id. 
 21. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy Wrongs in Search of Remedies, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
877 passim (2003); Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L. 
REV. 717, 720 (2001); Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy 
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg, Restoring 
Americans’ Privacy in Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 771, 773 (1999). See also 
Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343 passim 
(2008); Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstanding of Privacy, 44 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 754–60, 767–70 (2007). See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of 
Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477 (2006) (developing a new taxonomy for privacy, focusing on 
activities that invade privacy); Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of 
Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1227 (2003) (conceptualizing privacy and advocating for 
protections that shape this concept). 
 22. See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier 
for Individual Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195, 221–27 (1992) (discussing various types of 
actionable invasions of privacy in the common law and the general requirement that there be a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the appropriated information) [hereinafter Reidenberg, 
Frontier for Individual Rights]. 
 23. Compare Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999 § 501, 15 U.S.C. § 
6801 (2006) (stating that a financial institution “shall establish appropriate standards . . . (3) to 
protect against unauthorized access”), with id. § 6802 (stating that a financial institution “may not 
. . . disclose . . . to a nonaffiliated third party any nonpublic personal information”). 
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that violates the expectations of the receiver.24 A security violation, by 
contrast, may involve a violation of a duty of care,25 but it rarely—if ever—
involves an intentional disclosure of information.26 These differences 
suggest that different approaches may be necessary for generating and 
enforcing data security and data privacy norms. 
A. DATA PRIVACY AND GLB 
Until recently, the principal regulation governing data privacy in the 
payment system was the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act27 (GLB).28 Section 501 
of the Act creates an obligation to protect the privacy of customer data.29 
Section 502 gives some limited heft to that obligation, requiring notice and 
an opportunity to opt out of any sharing of data with a non-affiliate, and 
limiting the reuse of that information by non-affiliates.30 This regime has 
been criticized for killing trees with relatively useless privacy notices, for 
providing precious little data privacy protection because affiliate sharing is 
permitted, and because the opt-out rule sets the default in favor of non-
affiliate sharing.31 
As a result, the onus for developing privacy standards, and establishing 
enforceable privacy rights, rests on consumers’ willingness and ability to 
contract for protection. In other words, if a consumer wishes to limit the 
sharing of her data, she must affirmatively opt out of data sharing, and, to 
the extent she wishes to limit affiliate sharing, she will have to negotiate for 
it.32 In most cases this will mean foregoing the commercial relationship 
with the financial institution. The limits of consumer contracting and the 
problem of contracts of adhesion have been well discussed elsewhere.33 
Paul Schwartz and I have discussed it specifically in the context of GLB, 
                                                                                                                                          
 24. Reidenberg, Frontier for Individual Rights, supra note 22, at 222–23. 
 25. Id. at 223–24. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 6801. 
 28. See generally Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches, supra note 1. 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (“It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an 
affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the 
security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.”). 
 30. Id. § 6802. 
 31. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the 2001 Privacy 
Conference: Protecting Consumers’ Privacy: 2002 and Beyond (Oct. 4, 2001), 
http://ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privisp1002.shtm. 
 32. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 
1246–67 (1998); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic 
Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2402–04 (1996); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the 
Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–67 (1997) [hereinafter 
Schwartz, Privacy Economics]; Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The 
Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1101–13 (1999); see also 
Janger & Schwartz, Limits on Default Rules, supra note 3, at 1221. 
 33. C & J Fertilizer. Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 1975); see 
generally Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1173 (1983). 
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and found the result unsatisfactory.34 We concluded that the likely product 
of GLB’s notice and opt-out regime is a lemons equilibrium in which bad 
privacy practices prevail.35 We raised these issues in 2002, and nothing that 
has happened since then has led us to question these conclusions. Instead 
the focus of regulatory concern has been identity theft, which is really not a 
“privacy” problem at all. The reasons for this shift of focus are discussed 
below. 
B. DATA SECURITY AND GLB § 501(B) 
GLB has relatively little to say on the subject of data security, but 
curiously, that is where the action has been.36 Section 501 of GLB consists 
principally of a delegation to the agencies that govern financial 
institutions.37 It provides in full: 
(b) Financial institutions safeguards 
In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a) of this section, each 
agency or authority described in section 505(a) of this title shall 
establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions 
subject to their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, 
and physical safeguards— 
(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records 
and information; 
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the 
security or integrity of such records; and 
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such 
records or information which could result in substantial harm or 
inconvenience to any customer.38 
It instructs the various bank supervisory agencies to develop regulations 
for handling customer data, such as PIN numbers, social security numbers, 
and other data that might create a risk of, among other things, identity 
                                                                                                                                          
 34. Janger & Schwartz, Limits on Default Rules, supra note 3, at 1230–32. 
 35. Craswell, supra note 14, at 49. Richard Craswell states: 
Because terms that are good for buyers are generally more expensive for sellers, any 
seller that offers better terms will charge a higher price to make the same level of 
profits she could make by offering less favorable terms at a lower price. However, if 
most buyers have good information about prices but only poor information about non-
price terms, they may not notice an improvement in non-price terms, while they will 
definitely notice the higher price. As a result, many buyers may stop purchasing from 
this seller. 
Id. 
 36. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2006). 
 37. Id. § 6801(b). 
 38. Id. 
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theft.39 In response, the various bank supervisory agencies promulgated the 
Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to 
Customer Information and Customer Notice that mandates risk assessments 
and the creation of a response program by financial institutions.40 In 
addition, the regulations contemplate a two-tier system of reporting security 
breaches.41 Any security breach must be reported to the financial 
institution’s supervising agency.42 If, after an investigation, it appears that 
there is risk to the consumer, then notice of the security breach must also be 
given to the consumer.43 While the Interagency Guidance is not perfect, it 
does mandate a relatively comprehensive architecture for managing 
sensitive personal financial data.44 The delegation contained in § 501(b) 
could have been exercised in any number of ways. But, unlike privacy, the 
task of regulating data security has not been left to contract. Data security 
has been regulated more robustly than secondary use. 
C. SELF REGULATION AND STANDARD SETTING—PCI DSS 
The regulation of data security has not been limited to government 
agencies. The payment card industry has taken it upon itself to engage in 
self regulation in this area through the creation of the Payment Card 
Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC).45 The PCI SSC consists of 
the entities responsible for clearing payment card transactions—Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express. This group has promulgated a series of 
protocols called the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard or PCI 
DSS.46 This standard is intended to form the basis for auditing the security 
practices of participants in the payment card clearance system.47 The PCI 
DSS standard requires participants in the payment system, in broad outline, 
to: 
                                                                                                                                          
 39. Id. §§ 6801(a), 6804(a)(1); Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized 
Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,752 (Mar. 29, 
2005), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2005/pdf/05-5980.pdf. 
 40. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer 
Information and Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,751–54. 
 41. Id. at 15,752; see also Edward J. Janger & Paul M. Schwartz, Anonymous Disclosure of 
Security Breaches: Mitigating Harm and Facilitating Coordinated Response, in SECURING 
PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 223, 227 (Anum Chander, et al. eds., 2008). 
 42. Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer 
Information and Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. at 15,752. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Schwartz & Janger, Data Security Breaches, supra note 1, at 920. 
 45. PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, http://www.pcisecuritystandards.org (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2010). 
 46. PCI SSC Data Security Standards Overview, PCI SECURITY STANDARDS COUNCIL, 
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml (last visited Dec. 30, 
2010). 
 47. Doug Drew & Sushila Nair, Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard in the Real 
World, INFO. SYS. CONTROL J., 1 (Sept./Oct. 2008), http://www.isaca.org/Journal/Past-
Issues/2008/Volume-5/Documents/jpdf0805-payment-card-industry.pdf. 
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1.   Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data. 
2.  [N]ot use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other 
security parameters. 
3. Protect stored cardholder data. 
4.  Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks. 
5.  Use and regularly update anti-virus software [on all systems 
commonly affected by malware]. 
6. Develop and maintain secure systems and applications. 
7.  Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know basis. 
8.  Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access. 
9.  Restrict physical access to cardholder data. 
10. Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder 
data. 
11.  Regularly test security systems and processes. 
12.  Maintain a policy that addresses information security. 48 
Notwithstanding the implementation of PCI DSS, there have been 
numerous data spills. Indeed, Hannaford Brothers and TJX Companies were 
both hacked in 2008.49 Ironically, Hannaford received its certification one 
day after being made aware of a two-month compromise of its internal 
system.50 The proponents of PCI DSS point out that PCI DSS compliance is 
assessed at a specific moment in time, and that none of the entities that have 
been breached was actually complying with the PCI DSS protocol at the 
time of its breach.51 They lay the blame, not on the protocols, but on the 
implementation of compliance validation procedures.52 
                                                                                                                                          
 48. Id. at 2. 
 49. Brian Krebs, Three Alleged Hackers Indicted in Large Identity-Theft Case, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 18, 2009, at A11; Dan Goodin, TJX Suspect Indicted in Heartland, Hannaford Breaches, 
THE REGISTER (Aug. 17, 2009, 8:49 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/08/17/heartland_pay 
ment_suspect. 
 50. Middleware Audits and Remediation for PCI Compliance: The New Frontier of PCI, 
EVANS RES. GRP., 1 (2009), http://www.evansresourcegroup.com/partners.html (follow “Read our 
Whitepaper: Middleware Audits and Remediation for PCI Compliance: The new frontier of PCI” 
hyperlink at bottom of page). 
 51. Jaikumar Vijayan, Post-Breach Criticism of PCI Security Standard Misplaced, Visa Exec 
Says, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 19, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/ 
9130073/Post_breach_criticism_of_PCI_security_standard_misplaced_Visa_exec_says. See also 
Goodin, supra note 49; Kim Zetter, TJX Hacker Charged with Heartland, Hannaford Breaches, 
WIRED (Aug. 17, 2009, 2:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/tjx-hacker-charged-
with-heartland/. 
 52. Andrew Conry Murray, PCI and the Circle of Blame, NETWORK COMPUTING (Feb. 23, 
2008), http://networkcomputing.com/data-protection/pci-and-the-circle-of-blame.php. 
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Interestingly, the payment card industry has proven much more 
interested in creating norms and an architecture for protecting data security 
than in articulating data sharing norms.53 One might point to the emergence 
of private issuers of “privacy seals,” such as Trust-E and Secure Scan, but 
the recent FTC settlement with ControlScan suggests that this market 
solution is far from perfect.54 In that case, a privacy seal provider was 
shown to have regularly failed to verify the privacy practices of the 
merchants it endorsed.55 
D. CONCLUSIONS AND QUESTIONS 
This brief review of the regulatory architecture raises a number of 
questions. First, why do the regulating agencies seem inclined to leave the 
creation and enforcement of data privacy norms to the law of contracts, 
while taking a more proactive approach to protecting data security? Second, 
why hasn’t the market responded through competition over privacy 
practices? And third, what does this tell us about the appropriate 
government approach to regulating data privacy as compared to data 
security? 
II. SOURCES OF REGULATION: COMMON LAW, CONTRACT 
AND REGULATION 
To decide whether public regulation is necessary one starts by asking 
whether there is a market failure.56 That question further turns on whether, 
left to themselves, the combination of private contracting behavior, contract 
law, and tort law will produce optimal regulation. The answer to this 
question in the context of data privacy and security may be too obvious to 
bear discussion. To the extent that contract is involved, Susan Block-Lieb 
and I, as well as Oren Bar-Gill, have written at length about the extent to 
which consumers make cognitive and heuristic errors in deciding whether 
to enter into consumer credit transactions.57 Consumers, it turns out, are 
notoriously bad at figuring out how much it is going to cost them to borrow 
money; they are also relatively bad at making inter-temporal comparisons 
between consumption in the present and consumption in the future.58 There 
is, moreover, a considerable literature on the extent to which consumers are 
                                                                                                                                          
 53. Evan Schuman, FTC: Web Site Security Seals are Lies, CBSNEWS.com, Mar. 5, 2010, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/03/05/opinion/main6270104.shtml. 
 54. Id. (discussing the “bogus” security verification supplied by ControlScan in the context of 
the FTC settlement). 
 55. Id. 
 56. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 389 (7th ed. 2007). 
 57. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 12–13; Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 12, at 1489–
90. 
 58. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 6, at 29–33. 
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even worse at negotiating over the non-price terms of contracts.59 What is 
clear is that consumers are not good at bargaining over either privacy or 
data security. As such, relying on contract to establish data privacy and 
security norms will place all of the power in the hands of the financial 
institutions that receive the information.60 
While comparing bad to worse may not be profitable, it is possible that 
consumers’ ability to bargain over data security is even worse than their 
ability to bargain over privacy terms. Consumers may be able to articulate 
their expectations about how their information might be used in broad 
terms.61 This failure of imagination and lack of information is even worse 
for data security. Consumers cannot be expected to understand or monitor 
the data security practices of their banks. And, while, from time to time, 
banks compete on the basis of data security,62 as far as consumers are 
concerned, their claims are entirely unverifiable. Indeed, the time when 
most financial institutions spend the most advertising about data security is 
after they have been subject to a breach.63 
Where bargaining is impossible, as with data security, the natural 
common law substitute is tort law.64 The law of negligence might be 
expected to step in to establish data security norms. The problem with 
relying on common law enforcement through private litigation is that even 
when consumers discover that they have been the victims of identity theft it 
is virtually impossible for the consumer to discover the source of the 
breached data.65 Thus, most data security breaches are likely to escape 
detection, and hence financial institutions are unlikely to fully internalize 
the costs associated with lax security practices. 
For these reasons, it is not surprising that contract and tort have not 
provided adequate protection of either data privacy or data security. Thus, it 
would appear that some form of regulatory response would be appropriate 
for determining what data privacy terms should be embodied in consumer 
credit and consumer payment contracts. Similarly, the nature of the 
obligation to prevent data theft, fraud, or identity theft will have to be 
created by public processes. Finally, the architecture for responding to data 
spills will likely require some degree of public coordination. 
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III. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU AS A 
REGULATOR OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY 
As noted above, in their 2008 article, Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-
Gill proposed the creation of an independent consumer financial protection 
agency.66 The tasks of such an agency would be to review the various 
consumer credit products offered to consumers to ensure that they were 
safe.67 A CFPB is part of the financial reform bill that was enacted this 
year.68 The financial reform bill is over 1300 pages long, but the key 
provisions are §§ 1031 and 1032. Section 1031 grants power to the Bureau 
to promulgate regulations that prohibit unfair, abusive, or deceptive acts or 
practices.69 Section 1032 authorizes the Bureau to mandate certain 
disclosures, and to create loan forms that, if used, provide a safe harbor 
from liability.70 
The principal focus in discussion of these sections has been the 
financial terms associated with such consumer credit products. Modern 
products, including credit cards and home mortgages, have often been 
designed expressly to hide their true costs.71 Back end fees, teaser rates, 
default rates, negative amortization, and balloon payments are just a few of 
what Warren describes as the “tricks and traps” that have become standard 
practices in the consumer credit market and, in particular, the subprime 
market.72 Warren and Bar-Gill proposed an agency that would examine 
such products for transparency and would examine marketing practices to 
ensure that loans were only extended to people for whom they were 
appropriate.73 The absence of such regulation played an important role in 
the financial meltdown of the last few years. 
Institutional competence is at the heart of Warren and Bar-Gill’s 
argument for a CFPB.74 It is not that statutory protections did not exist for 
consumers in credit transactions. Their concerns were the related problems 
of regulatory capture and diffusion of responsibility.75 Warren and Bar-Gill 
were concerned instead that too many agencies had jurisdiction over 
consumer protection, but none had it as its core purpose.76 The FDIC, the 
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OCC, and the Federal Reserve all had some responsibility for consumer 
protection, but their core function was protecting the safety and soundness 
of the banking system.77 By contrast, the FTC had consumer protection as a 
core function, but little expertise with financial products.78 
While the CFPB’s intended focus is on lending products, and on the 
credit function associated with payment cards, the use of credit cards as 
payment devices raises a different set of safety issues that might be handled 
similarly by such an agency. Data privacy and data security are just as much 
terms of the credit/payment card contract as is the interest rate. And, if 
anything, they are less transparent. The question therefore is not, could the 
CFPB mandate include data privacy and data security; the question is 
whether it should, as a matter of comparative institutional competence. 
In considering whether the CFPB would be an appropriate regulator of 
financial privacy and security, the divide between data privacy and data 
security is instructive. While legislation and regulation at the federal level 
have not been perfect in either category, the regulations promulgated under 
§ 501(b) relating to data security are far more thoughtful than those relating 
to data privacy.79 Similarly, to the extent that self regulation has had any 
impact whatsoever, it has had influence on the data security side.80 
This discrepancy may be traceable to the intrinsic difference between 
data privacy and data security. Where data privacy is involved, there is an 
inherent conflict of interest between consumers and banks. Consumers 
expect their data to be kept confidential, and expect secondary use to be 
narrowly cabined. The financial institutions would like to have as much 
discretion as possible in how they use personal information. They have 
every incentive to contract for broad discretion, and to ensure that 
legislation does not interfere with their ability to use information as they 
desire.  
By contrast, where data security is involved, the conflict of interest 
between consumer and financial institution has a different contour. While 
financial institutions do have an incentive to limit the extent to which 
contracts or legal regulations might lead to the imposition of liability, they 
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also have a relatively strong interest in ensuring that personal data remains 
secure. 
This interest is not a product of their particular interest in data security. 
Instead, it is a product of the risk of loss rules that govern parties in the 
payment system. One can go as far back as the rule in Price v. Neal,81 and 
the properly payable rule under 4-401 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) to see that the risk of fraud is placed, in the first instance, on the 
bank that fails to detect it.82 If a financial institution honors an unauthorized 
check, it must re-credit the account.83 Similarly, under the Truth in Lending 
Act (TILA), the credit card bank must re-credit the account if an 
unauthorized charge is made on a credit card.84 While, in both cases, it may 
be possible for the paying bank to push liability down to the merchant who 
initially took the check or accepted the card, the loss is going to rest on a 
bank, not on the consumer. In this regard, banks have every incentive to 
make sure that data remains secure. This interest is reflected in the self 
regulation that produced a program like PCI DSS. Here, the alignment 
between the banking industry and the bank regulatory agencies may be a 
plus rather than a minus. 
This alignment of interest between consumers and financial institutions 
appears to be reflected as an alignment of interest between regulators and 
the regulated. There are types of coordination and response that cannot be 
handled by one firm alone. Neither can a consortium of private actors 
accomplish such coordination without public assistance. 
PCI DSS and the Hannaford data spill offer an example of both the 
promise of self regulation and its limits. PCI DSS may be a well considered 
and effective standard for protecting data security, but the standard setting 
body has limited power to enforce the standards it sets.85 It can audit 
participants in the payment system.86 It can deprive victims of data spills 
membership going forward, but it cannot, in any meaningful way, punish, 
and it has limited power to exclude members.87 
By contrast, the existence of a standard such as PCI DSS may work 
effectively in conjunction with tort law to set the standard by which 
negligence might be judged, after the fact. PCI DSS could provide a 
framework for regulatory agencies to include or exclude participants from 
the payment system. 
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Note here, however, that the pattern I am describing for data security is 
very different from the one the CFPB would establish for defining terms. 
This pattern involves cooperation among a self-regulatory organization, the 
industry, and the agency. This is the sort of cooperation that might best be 
accomplished through the OCC or Federal Reserve where the goal is the 
safety and soundness of the financial system, and protection (for better or 
worse) of the industry itself. By contrast, where data privacy is involved, 
such a cooperative relationship is anathema to the function of protecting 
consumers. 
CONCLUSION 
As such, and in conclusion, it appears that it may be desirable to split 
the regulation of data privacy and data security in two. The articulation of 
data security and data privacy norms might properly be entrusted to the 
CFPB. An agency focused on consumer protection is in the best position to 
generate and impose the default terms relating to privacy and security that 
will find their way into consumer credit and payment contracts. However, 
the regulation of data protection procedures, and the development of 
programs for mitigating the harm caused by security breaches would best be 
handled by the bank regulatory agencies themselves. 
